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ON WHITCOMB’S  
GROUNDING ARGUMENT FOR ATHEISM
Joshua Rasmussen, Andrew Cullison, and Daniel Howard-Snyder
Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is 
supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the 
nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes 
that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whit-
comb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult ques-
tion. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the 
argument relies on is false. Second, the argument equivocates between two 
kinds of grounding: instance-grounding and quasi-mereological ground-
ing. Happily, the equivocation can be avoided; unhappily, avoidance comes 
at the price of a false premise.
I. Parody
One way to argue for atheism is to argue that one of the properties God 
is supposed to have could not be had by anything. Thus, for example, 
one might argue that there is no God because God is supposed to be 
omni potent and nothing could be omnipotent due to a suitably subtle 
version of the paradox of the stone. And there are other well-known argu-
ments of this form. Continuing in this grand tradition, Dennis Whitcomb 
argues that there is no God because God is supposed to be omniscient and 
nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding and its rela-
tion to knowledge.1 Whitcomb offers two versions of his argument, one 
informal and the other formal. In what follows we assess both versions.
The informal version goes like this:
Suppose for reductio that someone is omniscient. Then his being omniscient 
is partly grounded by his knowing that he is omniscient (which is one of 
the knowings that helps make him all-knowing). And his knowing that he 
is omniscient is partly grounded by his being omniscient (for knowledge is 
partly grounded by the truth of what is known). Since partial grounding 
is transitive, it follows that his being omniscient is partly grounded by his 
being omniscient. But this result is absurd, for nothing can partly ground 
itself. Hence our reductio assumption is false. That is to say, it is false that 
1Dennis Whitcomb, “Grounding and Omniscience,” forthcoming, Oxford Studies in Phi-
losophy of Religion 4 (2012).
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someone is omniscient. But if God exists, then he is omniscient. Therefore, 
God does not exist.2
Is the informal version of Whitcomb’s grounding argument for atheism 
sound? To answer that question, consider the following definition and 
assumption:
Definition. “X is daniscient” =df. “X knows all and only whatever prop-
ositions Dan Howard-Snyder happens to know.”
Assumption. One of the propositions that Dan Howard-Snyder happens 
to know is that Dan Howard-Snyder is daniscient.
Now consider the following parody argument:
Suppose for reductio that Dan Howard-Snyder is daniscient. Then his 
being daniscient is partly grounded by his knowing that he is dan-
iscient (which is one of the knowings that helps make him daniscient). 
And his knowing that he is daniscient is partly grounded by his being 
daniscient (for knowledge is partly grounded by the truth of what is 
known). Since partial grounding is transitive, it follows that his being 
daniscient is partly grounded by his being daniscient. But this result 
is absurd, for nothing can partly ground itself. Hence our reductio as-
sumption is false. That is to say, it is false that Dan Howard-Snyder 
is daniscient. But if Dan Howard-Snyder exists, then he is daniscient.3 
Therefore, Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist.
It appears that if the informal version of Whitcomb’s grounding argument 
for atheism is sound, then Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist. But he does 
exist. (If you doubt this, run the argument using your own name.) There-
fore, the informal version of Whitcomb’s argument is unsound.
Informal versions of an argument are often bettered by their formal 
versions. Here is Whitcomb’s formal version of the argument, ever so 
slightly altered:
Let “↤” abbreviate “is partly grounded by” and let “[P]” abbreviate 
“the fact that P.” Now consider the following four true principles:
TRANSITIVITY: For all facts X, Y, and Z: if X ↤ Y and Y ↤ Z, then X ↤ Z.
IRREFLEXIVITY: For every fact F, it is not the case that F ↤ F.
TRUTH GROUNDS KNOWLEDGE (TGK): For every fact F of the form 
S knows that K, F ↤ [K].
∃∀ GROUNDING: Every existential-universal (∃∀) fact ↤ each of its 
instances.
2Ibid., 5 (manuscript).
3This is true because both the antecedent and the consequence are true (which is not to 
say, of course, that the conditional is necessarily true).
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To illustrate ∃∀ GROUNDING, suppose that it is a fact that someone 
is loved by everyone: ∃x∀y(y loves x). Call that fact “L.” Further, sup-
pose that Igor is loved by everyone, and that Sam and Pat are among 
the people who exist. Then ∃∀ GROUNDING tells us that L is partly 
grounded by [Sam loves Igor], and partly grounded by [Pat loves Igor]. 
That is to say, it tells us that L is partly grounded by both of these 
two instances it has—these two as well as many others. (We trust the 
intended meaning of “instance” is sufficiently clear from the examples. 
For a more precise definition, see Whitcomb’s Appendix 2.)
These four principles are inconsistent with
OMNISCIENCE: It is a fact that there is some being x such that for 
every fact f, x knows f.
Proof: Let “G” name one of the individuals who knows every fact, ac-
cording to OMNISCIENCE, and let “O” name [there is some being x 
such that for every fact f, x knows f]. Then:
1. [G knows O] is an instance of O (by OMNISCIENCE)
2. O ↤ [G knows O] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)
3. [G knows O] ↤ O (by OMNISCIENCE and TGK)
4. O ↤ O (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)
5. ¬(O ↤ O) (by IRREFLEXIVITY)
Contradiction (4, 5)
Since God exists only if OMNISCIENCE is true, and OMNISCIENCE 
is inconsistent with our four true principles of grounding, God does 
not exist.4
What should we make of this argument?
Well, consider the following parody argument:
TRANSITIVITY, IRREFLEXIVITY, TGK, and ∃∀ GROUNDING are all 
true and inconsistent with
DANISCIENCE: It is a fact that there is some being x such that for every 
fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f.
Proof: Let “Dan Howard-Snyder” name one of the individuals who 
knows every fact that Dan Howard-Snyder knows, according to DAN-
ISCIENCE, and let “D” name [there is some being x such that for every 
fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f]. Then:
1. [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] is an instance of D (by DAN-
ISCIENCE)
4Ibid., 6–7, 14 (manuscript).
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2. D ↤ [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)
3. [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] ↤ D (by DANISCIENCE and TGK)
4. D ↤ D (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)
5. ¬(D ↤ D) (by IRREFLEXIVITY)
Contradiction (4, 5)
Since Dan Howard-Snyder exists only if DANISCIENCE is true, 
and DANISCIENCE is inconsistent with our four true principles of 
grounding, Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist.
It appears that if the formal version of Whitcomb’s grounding argument 
for atheism is sound, then Dan Howard-Snyder does not exist. But he does 
exist. Therefore, the formal version of Whitcomb’s argument is unsound.
II. Diagnosis
We conclude that Whitcomb’s grounding argument for atheism, in both 
its informal and formal versions, is unsound. But why is it unsound? This 
is not an easy question to answer. Still, we venture an answer. In fact, 
we venture two. It is unsound because ∃∀ GROUNDING is false and/or 
because it commits the fallacy of equivocation. We explain each answer 
in turn.
Recall that, according to ∃∀ GROUNDING, every ∃∀ fact is partly 
grounded by each of its instances. It’s not too difficult, however, to get in a 
frame of mind where one might well think one can see that there are some 
∃∀ facts that are not partly grounded by each of their instances. Indeed, 
we only need look to omniscience’s near neighbor omnipotence to find 
a candidate. Omnipotence, as one might expect, has to do with power, 
particularly the ability to bring about every metaphysically possible state 
of affairs (roughly). Suppose, just for the sake of illustration, that
OMNIPOTENCE: It is a fact that there is some being x such that for 
every metaphysically possible state of affairs s, x is able to bring about 
s.
OMNIPOTENCE is an ∃∀ fact. Thus, if, as ∃∀ GROUNDING tells us, every 
∃∀ fact is partly grounded by each of its instances, then (say) Theia’s ability 
to bring about every metaphysically possible state of affairs is partly 
grounded by, for example, her ability to bring it about that the freezing 
level drops at Goat Rocks tonight.5 But this implication seems false. Indeed, 
the reverse seems true: Theia’s ability to bring it about that the freezing 
level drops at Goat Rocks tonight is partly grounded by her ability to bring 
5See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goat_Rocks. “The Goat Rocks are a series of rugged 
volcanic peaks in the Cascade Range, roughly between Mount Rainier and Mount Adams 
in southern Washington state. They are named after the numerous mountain goats which 
live in the area, and are at the core of the eponymous Goat Rocks Wilderness.”
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about every metaphysically possible state of affairs. In that case, if we add 
IRREFLEXIVITY—according to which, for every fact F, it is not the case 
that F is partly grounded by F—∃∀ GROUNDING turns out false.
One might agree that ∃∀ GROUNDING is false in its full generality and 
that omnipotence shows that this is so, but nevertheless insist that it ap-
plies to omniscience. This would be a mistake, however. For suppose that 
omnipotence shows that ∃∀ GROUNDING is false in its full generality. 
Now, just as omnipotence has to do with power, so does omniscience—
cognitive power, particularly the ability to know all facts (roughly, and in 
keeping with Whitcomb’s usage). It seems that what we said about omnip-
otence is rightly said about omniscience. Theia’s ability to know all facts is 
not partly grounded by, for example, her ability to know that the freezing 
level will drop at Goat Rocks tonight. Rather, her ability to know that 
the freezing level will drop at Goat Rocks tonight is partly grounded by 
her ability to know all facts. Add IRREFLEXIVITY and ∃∀ GROUNDING 
turns out false with respect to omniscience.
So much for ∃∀ GROUNDING. We now turn to equivocation. TGK 
and ∃∀ GROUNDING seem to be about different grounding relations. 
Recall that according to TGK, for every fact F of the form S knows that 
K, F is partly grounded by [K]. Here the grounding relation seems to in-
volve something being grounded by its parts or constituents. Knowledge 
is partly grounded by the fact known in that it is a part or constituent 
of knowledge. Part of what it is to for us to know that the Knife’s Edge 
is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness is for it to be the case that the Knife’s 
Edge is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness; it’s being the case that the Knife’s 
Edge is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness is a constituent of our knowing that 
the Knife’s Edge is in the Goat Rocks Wilderness. The grounding here 
appears to be mereological or, better, quasi-mereological.6 (We leave the 
quasi-qualification implicit from here on out.) Not so for ∃∀ GROUNDING. 
According to ∃∀ GROUNDING, every ∃∀ fact is partly grounded by each 
of its instances. Here the grounding relation seems to involve facts being 
grounded by their instances. For example, [∃x(x is a person)] is partly 
grounded by [Barack Obama is a person]; and, to draw on Whitcomb’s 
illustrative hypothetical case, [∃x∀y(y loves x)] is partly grounded by [Sam 
loves Igor], [Pat loves Igor], and so on.
Now, it might be tempting to think of instances as in some sense parts 
of the facts they instance. Perhaps this temptation underwrites some of 
the appeal of ∃∀ GROUNDING. However, some instances cannot be so 
thought of. Take, for example, [∃x(x is a fact)]. Call it “E.” Notice that [E is 
a fact] is an instance of E but [E is a fact] is not a part or constituent of E. 
If anything, it’s the other way around: E is a part or constituent of [E is a 
6Karen Bennett calls this sort of relation a “building” grounding relation in “Construc-
tion Area (No Hard Hat Required),” Philosophical Studies 154:1, 79–104. See also Whitcomb’s 
commentary on TGK, pages 11–13 (manuscript), where he characterizes the grounding rela-
tion involved in TGK in mereological, or quasi-mereological, terms.
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fact]. Thus, from a mereological point of view, [E is a fact] might well be 
partly grounded by E, but E is not an instance of [E is a fact].
The same goes for the ∃∀ facts on the table. [Dan Howard-Snyder 
knows D] is an instance of D but it is not a part or constituent of D. That 
is, [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] is an instance of [there is some being x 
such that for every fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f], but 
the former is not a part or constituent of the latter. Likewise, [G knows 
O] is an instance of O but it is not a part or constituent of O. That is, [G 
knows O] is an instance of [there is some being x such that for every fact f, 
x knows f], but the former is not a part or constituent of the latter.
The upshot, then, is this: the instance grounding relation is not iden-
tical with the mereological grounding relation.
Whitcomb’s grounding argument for atheism and our parody argu-
ment make use of both types of grounding. Here’s the relevant portion of 
the formal version of Whitcomb’s argument:
2. O ↤ [G knows O] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)
3. [G knows O] ↤ O (by OMNISCIENCE and TGK)
4. O ↤ O (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)
Here’s the relevant portion of our parity argument:
2. D ↤ [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] (by 1 and ∃∀ GROUNDING)
3. [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] ↤ D (by OMNISCIENCE and TGK)
4. D ↤ D (by 2, 3, and TRANSITIVITY)
The relation expressed by “↤” in each version of (2) is the instance 
grounding relation, whereas the relation expressed by “↤” in each ver-
sion of (3) is the mereological grounding relation. Thus, each argument 
equivocates. Consequently, (4) of each argument doesn’t follow from (2) 
and (3), at least not by TRANSITIVITY, whose application demands a 
single relation and not just a single symbol or form of words.
Can equivocation be avoided? We think so, but only if there is a gen-
eral grounding relation that encompasses both mereological grounding 
and instance grounding. However, if there is such a general grounding 
relation, then—since mereological grounding (or whatever grounding is 
involved in TGK) dictates that [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] is partly 
grounded by D, which, recall, is [there is some being x such that for every 
fact f known by Dan Howard-Snyder, x knows f], and instance grounding 
dictates that D is partly grounded by [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D]—it 
grounds in both directions, from D to [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] 
and from [Dan Howard-Snyder knows D] to D. Now: either this general 
grounding relation is transitive or it is not. If it is transitive, then D is 
partly grounded by D, in which case it is not irreflexive and Whitcomb’s 
IRREFLEXIVITY is false. If, on the other hand, it is not transitive, then 
Whitcomb’s TRANSITIVITY is false. Equivocation can be avoided in our 
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parity argument, therefore, but only at the usual price: a false premise. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same goes for Whitcomb’s grounding argument for 
atheism.7
Azusa Pacific University 
SUNY Fredonia 
Western Washington University
7For comments on previous drafts, thanks to Ben Corey, Tom Flint, Frances Howard-
Snyder, Hud Hudson, Ryan Wasserman, Dennis Whitcomb, and an anonymous referee.
